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Abstract
To many economists the public’s support for the minimum wage (MW) institution
is puzzling, since the MW is considered a “blunt instrument” for redistribution. To
delve deeper in this issue we build models in which workers are heterogeneous in
ability. In the first model, the government does not engage in any type of redistribu-
tive policies - except for the payment of unemployment benefits; we find that the
MW is preferred by the majority of workers (even when the unemployed receive very
generous unemployment benefits). In the second model, the government engages in
redistribution through the public provision of private goods. We show that (i) the
introduction of a MW can be preferred by a majority of workers only if the un-
employed receive benefits which are substantially below the after-tax earnings they
would have had in the perfectly competitive case, (ii) for a given generosity of the
unemployment benefit scheme, the maximum, politically viable, MW is lower than
in the absence of in-kind redistribution, and (iii) the MW institution is politically
viable only when there is a limited degree of in-kind redistribution. These findings
can possibly explain why a well-developed social safety net in Scandinavia tends to
co-exist with the absence of a national MW, whereas in Southern Europe the MW
institution “complements” the absence of a well-developed social safety net.
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“Of course, nothing helps families make ends meet like higher wages…and to 
everyone in this Congress who still refuses to raise the minimum wage, I say this: If 
you truly believe you could work full-time and support a family on less than $15,000 
a year, go try it. If not, vote to give millions of the hardest-working people in America 
a raise.” 
President Obama, State of the Union address (January 20, 2015) 
 
1. Introduction 
To many economists the public‟s support for the minimum wage (MW hereafter) 
institution is puzzling, since the minimum wage is considered a “blunt instrument” for 
redistribution (Card and Krueger, 1995, p.285). The purpose of this paper is to enquire 
into the popularity of the MW institution when non-blunt instruments of redistribution 
are part of the policy landscape.
1
   
The public‟s support for a (statutory) MW is well documented. For instance, in 
a January 2014 Pew Research Center poll, 73% of Americans supported a rise in the 
national MW to $10.10 (per hour) from the then (and still) current $7.25 rate.  
Moreover, in a December 2013 Wall Street Journal poll, 63% were in support of an 
increase to $10.10, whereas 43% said they backed an increase to $12.50 an hour, and 
28% backed a $15 MW. These figures reveal that if the question involved smaller 
increases in the MW (e.g. to $9.00) the support would be overwhelming. In Germany, 
one of the few countries which only recently (July 2014) voted to introduce, for the 
first time, a (national) MW, a survey of German managers, conducted for the 
Handelsblatt business newspaper in July 2013, showed that 57% wanted a mandatory 
MW in the country. (Interestingly, managers in service industries were the most in 
favour, with 61% saying they wanted a MW.) The decision by the German 
government to proceed with MW legislation must partly reflect the overwhelming 
support for it by the public.
2
  
In contrast to the public‟s (and politicians‟) support, MW laws have been 
vociferously condemned by (many) economists since they were first introduced.
3
 
                                                          
1
 An often mentioned example of a less blunt instrument is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 
US, and similar schemes exist in Canada and the UK. Many continental European countries also 
operate means-tested social minima schemes.  
2
 According to a ZDF “political barometer” poll in October 2013, 83% of respondents were in support 
of introducing a nationwide hourly MW of €8.50 – this was in fact the MW that became effective in 
January 2015. 
3
 Economists are not alone in opposing MW laws. Prominent exponents of “egalitarian liberalism” like, 
e.g. John Rawls (1971, p. 245 ), insist that justice is a matter of fairness, especially for society‟s worst 
off and have suggested that tax-and-transfer policies are preferable to MW laws as means of achieving 
distributive justice. This is because liberals‟ priority concern for society‟s worst off may render the 
3 
 
Webb (1912), with reference to the imposition of a MW in the Australian province of 
Victoria in 1896,  mentions that it was opposed with familiar arguments, i.e. that „it 
was "against the laws of Political Economy", that it would cause the most hardly 
pressed businesses to shut down, that it would restrict employment, that it would drive 
away Capital, that it would be cruel to the aged worker and the poor widow, that it 
could not be carried out in practice, and so on and so forth‟ (p. 973). Yet, Webb 
concluded, that in a few years the minimum wage institution was receiving such 
widespread support that „… no statesman, no economist, no political party nor any 
responsible newspaper of Victoria, however much a critic of details, ever dreams now 
of undoing the Minimum Wage Law itself‟ (p. 976).   
One can probably understand why in the age of “unfettered capitalism” 
(Eichengreen, 1992) even conservative politicians like Winston Churchill would see 
minimum wage laws as a benign development when he argued in favour of  
introducing the MW in the UK in 1909.
4
  It is however less easy to understand why 
nowadays even conservative politicians in countries which used to have until the 
previous decade (i.e. before the Hartz reforms) generous means-tested social minima 
(e.g. Chancellor Angela Merkel) are willing to introduce the MW as a 
redistributive/anti-poverty device, despite the strong opposition of academic 
economists, and the evidence that the MW is not an efficient device for transferring 
incomes to the working poor.
5
      
                                                                                                                                                                      
MW especially problematic, since those with few skills or marginal labour market connections face the 
greatest likelihood of job loss after a mandated wage increase.  
4
 Churchill stated that "It is a serious national evil that any class of His Majesty's subjects should 
receive less than a living wage in return for their utmost exertions. It was formerly supposed that the 
working of the laws of supply and demand would naturally regulate or eliminate that evil... and... 
ultimately produce a fair price. Where... you have a powerful organisation on both sides... there you 
have a healthy bargaining... But where you have what we call sweated trades, you have no 
organisation, no parity of bargaining, the good employer is undercut by the bad, and the bad employer 
is undercut by the worst.... where those conditions prevail you have not a condition of progress, but a 
condition of progressive degeneration." (available at:  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 
1909/apr/28/trade-boards-bill). Churchill‟s justification appears to capture well the sentiment of a New 
England textile worker whose response to a journalist‟s question regarding the minimum wage 
provisions established by President Roosevelt was: “You can guess that the money is handy...But there 
is something more than the money. There is knowing that the working man don‟t stand alone against 
the bosses and their smart lawyers and all their tricks. There is a government now that cares whether 
things is fair for us.” (quoted in Vincent and Amidon, 1964). 
5
 The standard argument is that most workers who gain from MW increases do not live in poor 
households, while some of those who do may lose their job as a result of such increases. Moreover, 
most people living in poverty do not work, and many of the working poor do not work full-time; or 
they work at hourly wage rates above the new minimum (Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2008).  The empirical evidence regarding the effect of MW increases on poverty for the US is 
not unambiguous as Neumark and Wascher (2008) and Dube (2013) reach different conclusions.  
However, the Congressional Budget Office (2014) argues that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is 
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To provide an answer to this question we build models in which the only point 
of departure from the conventional labour market model is in assuming that workers 
are heterogeneous in ability, which is in turn reflected in differences in labour income 
across workers. This assumption allows us to differentiate among high- and low-
ability workers, as it will be the former that may gain from the rise in the wage rate 
per efficiency unit of labour - whereas the latter may face unemployment – as a result 
of the imposition of a MW per unit of labour time. The reason we deliberately adopt 
an otherwise bare bones perfectly competitive labour market framework in our 
analysis is not because we believe that the perfectly competitive framework would be 
the “natural” outcome in the absence of minimum wages – after all, political 
institutions, government policies and regulations have a discernible impact on the so-
called “market” outcomes. (Thus, outcomes that appear like „natural‟ market 
allocations may in fact be the result of political decisions, or indeed of deliberate 
policy inaction.) It is also done not because we wish to ignore the various arguments 
that have been put forward in order to explain the possibly benign influence of 
minimum wages on employment, growth, or welfare (see, e.g. Card and Krueger, 
1995; Manning, 1995 and 2003;  Cahuc and Michel, 1996;  Askenazy, 2003).  We do 
it because we wish to use a first-best benchmark and to ensure the disemployment 
effects of the MW, since in the opposite case there would be no puzzle regarding the 
support for the MW institution.  
In the first model we present, the government does not engage in any type of 
redistributive policies. We use this model to enquire whether the introduction of the 
MW can be beneficial for the majority of workers, whilst taking into account of the 
need to raise taxes to support the workers that remain unemployed. By deriving the 
conditions required for the MW to be preferred by the majority of workers we are able 
to demonstrate that under any plausible constellation of plausible parameter values the 
MW is preferred by the majority of workers (even when the unemployed receive very 
generous unemployment benefits).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
a far superior way to provide additional income to workers who live in poor families. This conclusion 
appears to be also supported by ex-ante simulations regarding the new German MW which predict that 
the MW will be an ineffective instrument for poverty reduction, because much of its cost will be offset 
by reductions in existing means-tested income support and high marginal tax rates (Müller and Steiner, 
2013). 
5 
 
We then proceed to build a model in which the government engages in 
redistribution through the public provision of private goods (in-kind transfers)
6
 and 
enquire whether there can be a majority of citizens supporting the introduction of the 
MW as an additional redistributive tool. Thus, our approach is not normative, and 
should be contrasted with models which adopt an optimal taxation perspective (see, 
e.g. Allen, 1987; Guesnerie and Roberts. 1987; Marceau and Boadway, 1994; 
Boadway and Cuff 2001; and Lee and Saez, 2012).
7
    
In our model the government uses the tax proceeds to finance the public  
provision of a good which is also provided by the private sector, albeit at different 
quality levels – a vertically differentiated product (VDP) like health, education, 
housing, or day care.   Households are assumed to derive utility from the consumption 
of the VDP (either of the variety freely provided by the government or of the variety 
offered by the private sector) and of a privately produced homogeneous product. We 
assume this type of in-kind redistribution since we wish the government to already 
have in use (i.e. before the introduction of a MW) a programme which is well 
targeted. As noted by Besley and Coate (1991) and Boadway and Marchand (1995), 
people with different incomes can value publicly provided goods differently, thus 
public provision can induce self-selection (e.g. only the poor choose to consume the 
relatively low quality of the good provided by the government - with the better-off 
preferring to avail themselves of higher quality varieties which are privately supplied) 
and achieve redistribution with lower efficiency costs than if cash transfers were 
used.
8
 
                                                          
6
 In virtually all countries, developed and developing, a significant amount of redistribution occurs in-
kind. The fraction of GDP spent on these programs is quite substantial, and has ranged between 10.0 to 
15.0 percent of GDP in OECD countries during the last decade. In contrast, the amount paid through a 
cash-transfer program like the EITC in the US is substantially smaller (e.g. about 0.5 percent of GDP in 
2015).      
7
 Note that among the more recent of these papers a minimum wage policy combined with forcing non-
working welfare recipients to look for jobs (and accept job offers) can increase the amount of 
redistribution from those working to those not working, and possibly reduce unemployment (Boadway 
and Cuff, 2001), while Lee and Saez (2012) show that a binding minimum wage enhances the 
effectiveness of transfers to low-skilled workers as it prevents low-skilled wages from falling through 
incidence effects thus, minimum wages can be an efficient complement to other transfer programmes. 
8
 It bears noting that actual transfer programmes, like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 
United States, in addition to being less efficient than what lump-sum redistribution can achieve in 
theoretical models (since, e.g., the implicit marginal tax rates involved in EITC can be higher than 80 
percent), are not easy to administer. According to the IRS, for fiscal year 2013, 24.0 percent of EITC 
payments were improper (e.g. payments to ineligible recipients) – as a comparison of the waste 
involved, note that only 9.3 percent of the payments made by the unemployment insurance scheme 
were deemed as improper (for more details, see:   https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-
2014-50.htm).  
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The introduction of a (binding) MW - which is set per unit of time rather than 
per effective unit of labour – will drive the lowest ability workers out of private 
employment, thus raising the marginal product and the wage rate (per effective unit of 
labour) of employed workers.
9
 As in the previous model, the government is assumed 
to atone for such an adverse effect on low-ability workers through the payment of 
unemployment benefits. Even though no analytical results can be derived in this case, 
we are able to establish the following results. First, the introduction of a MW can be 
preferred by a majority of workers only if the unemployed receive benefits which are 
substantially below the after-tax earnings they would have in the PC case.  Thus, the 
presence of in-kind redistribution reduces substantially the political popularity of the 
MW. Second, for a given generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme, the 
maximum, politically viable, markup of the MW (per unit of time) relative to the PC 
benchmark is lower than in the absence of in-kind redistribution.  This implies that –
ceteris paribus - countries with non-existent (or meager) in-kind redistributive 
schemes (e.g. Greece) would tend to have higher minimum wages than countries with 
extensive in-kind redistribution. Third, the stronger is the extent of in-kind 
redistribution (measured by the difference between the quality of the VDP provided 
by the government and the quality provided by the private sector), the smaller will be 
the proportion of workers supporting the introduction of a minimum wage irrespective 
of the generosity of the unemployment benefit system. 
These findings imply that if, for exogenous reasons, the political equilibrium 
shifts from one which involves generous redistribution (high quality of the publicly 
provided VDP) to one of less generous redistribution (lower quality), then there can 
now be a majority of workers who are in favour of introducing a (binding) minimum 
wage. This finding can possibly explain why a well-developed social safety net in 
Scandinavia tends to co-exist with the absence of a national minimum wage, whereas 
in Southern Europe nationally binding (and relatively-high) minimum wages are 
usually paired with the absence of a well-developed social safety net.
10
 Arguably, it 
                                                          
9
 This feature of our model is akin to the assumption made by Lee and Saez (2012) that the 
unemployment induced by the minimum wage is efficient, i.e. unemployment hits workers with the 
lowest surplus first. 
10
 For example, currently (2017) in Greece the unemployment rate is close to 23% and yet only about 
10 percent of the unemployed receive unemployment benefits; this is due to various strict eligibility 
criteria. Moreover, the monthly unemployment benefit is set at  €360 ( which is 55% of the minimum 
wage), is independent of previous earnings, and its maximum duration is 12 months; for those 
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits there exist some welfare benefits whose maximum 
monthly value (if eligibility criteria make it available) is €200.     
7 
 
can also have been one of the factors
11
 influencing the recent decision in Germany to 
institute a (national) MW, which followed the previous decade‟s reductions in the 
generosity of explicit and implicit welfare support involved in the, so-called, Hartz 
reforms. In this vein, our finding echoes Acemoglu and Robinson‟s (2013) recent 
argument
12
 that the politico-economic environment may have features (e.g. an overly 
generous welfare system) whose removal may ex-ante look efficient if one does not 
take into account how their removal may affect the future political equilibrium. But, if 
their removal induces unions now to switch their support in favour of the MW as a 
“savior of last resort”, it can lead to the emergence of policies that generate greater 
efficiency losses than those entailed by the policies which were removed.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present 
the model without in-kind redistribution. Section 3 introduces in-kind redistribution, 
and examines how the interplay between the generosity of unemployment insurance 
and in-kind redistribution shapes political preferences with regard to the introduction 
of a MW. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.   
 
2. The Model without In-Kind Redistribution 
The main interest in this model is to establish that in the absence of other 
redistributive policies the imposition of a minimum wage can be beneficial to the 
majority of workers. To this purpose we construct a model in which worker 
heterogeneity in ability generates differences in preferences over the introduction of 
minimum wages. 
13
 
 
2.1 Perfectly Competitive Labour Market  
                                                          
11
 Other factors, including the decline of trade union coverage, the increasing incidence of low-wage 
employment, and public opinion strongly in favour of the minimum wage, induced unions to move in 
favour of a statutory minimum wage. Framing the issue was also important: the principle was that the 
minimum wage should be set such that single person working full-time would earn enough not to 
require additional support from social assistance, and thus to regulate the subsidization of low pay by 
the welfare state. This framing of the MW debate built on opposition to the Hartz reforms and 
resistance to the emergence of a second-class welfare status for workers who could not establish an 
insurance record.  The desire to regulate competition from service contractors based in other countries 
drew out support for the MW from CDU and CSU politicians at the state level, since it provided a 
straightforward way to insist on minimum wages in public contracts (for more details see, Hassel 
(2014) and  Eichhorst (2015)). 
12
 See also Dixit (1997) and Drazen (2002) who made a plea that economists‟ policy advice should be 
informed by what is incentive compatible for politicians.  
13
 Adam and Moutos (2011) show in a model without worker heterogeneity, that once an optimally 
chosen (i.e. from the median-voter‟s perspective) MW is in existence, the median voter would not be 
willing to support the introduction of employment subsidies as an alternative to the MW.   
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We consider a closed economy which produces and consumes a single homogeneous 
good, X, which is produced by private-sector firms only. We assume that all 
households are endowed with one unit of labour, which they offer inelastically.  There 
are, however, differences in skill between households, which are reflected in 
differences in the endowment of each household‟s effective labor supply. This is in 
turn reflected in differences in income across households. We assume that firms pay 
the same wage rate per effective unit of labor –thus the distribution of talent across 
firms does not affect unit production costs. 
Good X is a homogeneous good produced by private-sector firms only, 
whereas good Y is a (vertically) differentiated product which can be produced at 
different quality levels by  private-sector firms and by the public sector.  
 
2.1.1 Production 
We use good Χ as the numeraire, and set its price to one,        The technology 
employed by the firms producing good X is: 
 
     
 
 
   ,                                                                                                    (1) 
                                                                                                                                
where L stands for the number of effective units of labour used. Denote by w the wage 
rate per effective unit of labour. Profit maximization implies that the demand for 
effective units of labour is:  
 
  
   
 
                                                                                                                        (2) 
 
The profits resulting from the production of the homogeneous good are
14
:  
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  .                                                                                                              (3) 
 
                                                          
14
 We are implicitly assuming that production requires the existence of a fixed factor (e.g. 
entrepreneurship) whose quantity is fixed at 1, and which is provided by the owners of the firms. We 
also set the number of firms to 1, and assume that the number of firm owners is very small relative to 
the population of workers so that, for simplicity, an without any loss of generality, their spending 
patterns can be ignored. Alternatively, we could assume that their income is such that they would 
always choose to buy the privately provided vertically differentiated product; doing so has no 
discernible effect on the qualitative nature of our results. 
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2.1.2 Households 
All workers/households are assumed to have identical preferences, and their mass is 
set to 1. For simplicity, and in order to aid comparison with the model of the 
following section, we write the utility function as  
 
  √   ,  
 
where    stands for the consumption of household i.  
Let 
ie  stand for household‟s i  endowment of effective number of labour units. 
We assume that there is a continuum of households,  0,1i , with Pareto distributed 
abilities. The Pareto distribution is defined over the interval e b , and its CDF is  
        
( ) 1 ( / ) , 1aF e b e a   .                                                                                             (5)          
 
Parameter b  stands for the lowest ability (i.e. effective labour units) among 
households, and parameter a  determines the shape of the distribution (higher values 
of a  imply greater equality). The Pareto distribution, in addition to being easy to 
work with, is a good approximation of actual income distributions. Empirical 
estimates of the value of a  range between 1.7 and 3.0 (see, Creedy (1977)). The mean 
ability of the Pareto distribution is equal to  
 
         ⁄                                                                                                           (6) 
 
and the ability of the median household is equal to 
 
     ⁄                                                                                                                     (7) 
                                                                                             
The consumption of each worker will be equal to her labour income, i.e.  
 
      .  
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2.1.3 Labour Market Equilibrium 
 
Labour market equilibrium obtains when the aggregate demand for effective units of 
labour is equal to the aggregate supply of effective units of labour. The latter is just 
the mean ability in the population, which is equal to (
  
   
).  Thus, we can state the 
condition for labour market equilibrium as:  
 
   
 
 
  
   
.  
 
This implies that the market-clearing wage rate per efficiency unit of labour is: 
    
   
   
.                                                                                                               (8) 
 
Thus, the competitive wage rate depends on the technology parameters (  and    – 
which determine the demand for labour – and on aggregate labour supply (as 
determined by parameters   and     We note that the elasticity of labour demand with 
respect to the wage rate per effective unit of labour – evaluated at the market-clearing 
wage rate is:                
      
   
 . Hamermesh (1993), in his review of more 
than 70 empirical studies, concludes that the most probable interval for the (absolute) 
value of the elasticity of labour demand  is   [0.15,  0.75]. Normalizing b to be equal 
to 1, assuming a value of   equal to 2, and choosing the values of   and   such that  
     , implies that the value of the elasticity is 0.5, i.e. within the range of plausible 
empirical values suggested by Hamermesh. We note that as long as the value of the 
elasticity is lower than 1, then the imposition of a binding minimum wage will result 
in a rise in aggregate labour income.   
 
2.2 Minimum Wage 
We now assume the existence of a government-imposed MW per unit of labour time 
(e.g. per hour) equal to  , which is the minimum amount that an employer must pay in 
order to employ one person. This MW per unit of time must be distinguished from the 
wage rate per effective unit of labour, which will be market-determined (i.e. as in the 
previous section).  
 
11 
 
2.2.1 Labour Market 
The MW implies that firms will not be willing to employ workers whose level of 
ability (i.e. number of efficient units of labour per unit of time) is such that:  
 
     , 
 
where  stands for the market-determined wage rate per effective unit of labour in the 
presence of the minimum-wage (per unit of time) constraint at time t.
15
  To avoid 
confusion in what follows we shall refer to the exogenously set,  , simply as the MW, 
in order to differentiate it from the minimum wage rate per effective unit of labour, 
 , and the competitive wage rate per effective unit of labour,  , both of which are 
endogenously determined. Let   denote the level of ability for which it holds that: 
 
                                                                                                                            (9) 
 
It follows that only workers with      will be employed by firms, and that the 
individual with ability   will just earn the MW,   . Workers with ability smaller than 
   will be unemployed, thus the unemployment rate – as well as the number of 
unemployed workers - will be:  
 
    ,
 
 
-
 
                                                                                                             (10)   
 
 The total number of effective units of labour possessed by individuals with      , 
and which are supplied is: 
 
   ∫  , 
  
    
-    
  
   
 
 
,
 
 
-
 
                                                                             (11)  
 
The wage rate per effective unit of labour paid by private sector firms is determined 
by equating the demand for effective labour units with the supply of effective labour 
units possessed by individuals with     ,  
 
                                                          
15
 We assume that the minimum wage per unit of time is such that     , i.e. that is binding for low-
ability workers. 
12 
 
   
 
 
  
   
{
 
 
}
 
   
 
This implies that the wage rate per effective unit of labour will be equal to:  
 
    
   
   
,
 
 
-
   
.                                                                                                  (12) 
 
Α simple comparison of equations (8) and (12) reveals that –ceteris paribus- a binding 
MW, which implies that    ,  will be associated with a higher wage rate per 
effective unit of labour than in its absence (      due to the reduction in the 
aggregate effective units of labour supply caused by the exclusion of the lowest-
ability workers from employment.  
 
2.2.2 Government 
In addition to setting (and enforcing) the minimum wage constraint, the government is 
assumed to levy a comprehensive income tax (τ) on all sources of income (except 
unemployment benefits), in order to finance the payment of benefits for the low-
ability workers that are unemployed. We assume that the level of the unemployment 
benefit is a fixed proportion of the minimum wage, i.e. it is equal to           . 
Parameter   describes the generosity of the unemployment benefit system. We note 
that in this model the granting of these benefits has an indefinite duration since the 
lowest-ability workers are permanently excluded from employment. In this sense, the 
income support provided to the unemployed is comparable to the real-world welfare 
payments (e.g. social assistance) provided to individuals whose eligibility for 
unemployment benefits has expired, or those who have never fulfilled the eligibility 
criteria for receiving them. Equation (12), i.e. the government budget constraint, just 
states that the net payments to the unemployed are equal to total tax receipts: 
 
 *(
   
 
)  
      
  
+=⌈      ⁄
 
⌉                                                                      (13) 
 
We assume that the tax rate adjusts so as to keep the budget in balance.  
  
2.3 Comparison  
13 
 
In the perfectly competitive (PC) case the wage rate is uniquely determined according 
to equation (8). In the minimum wage (MW) case, the wage rate, as a function of the 
minimum wage, y, can be determined by solving equations (9) and (12), and is, as 
noted earlier, higher than the PC wage rate.  
However, we wish to enquire whether the workers which retain their jobs after 
the imposition of the MW have higher after-tax incomes than in the PC case. This will 
be the case if the after-tax wage rate in the MW case is larger than the PC wage rate, 
i.e. if   
 
        .      
 
To examine whether the above inequality holds, we start by  assuming that a MW (per 
unit of time) is imposed which is set higher than the wage income (per unit of time) 
which the worker with the lowest ability in the population would receive in the PC 
case; i.e.                . Parameter   measures the extent by which the 
income of the lowest-ability worker would increase if he remained in employment 
after the introduction of the MW; in other words   is the gross markup on the 
competitive wage income of the lowest ability worker. Moreover, in order to derive an 
analytical expression for the tax rate, we assume that the inequality parameter    is 
equal to 2. This assumption is necessary since otherwise we would not be able to 
derive an analytical expression for the tax rate.  
In the appendix we show that the tax rate in the MW case is:  
 
  
[           ][            ]        
   [         ]
                                                                    (14). 
 
We note that if     - which is the PC case - the tax rate is zero as no unemployment 
benefits need to be paid.  
The imposition of a MW will be prefered by a majority among workers if (i) 
the after-tax wage income of employed workers is higher than their wage income in 
the PC case, and (ii) if the unemployment rate is less than 50 percent.  In the 
Appendix we show that both of these conditions are satisfied if the following two 
conditions hold simultaneously for the parameter describing the generosity of the 
unemployment benefits system ( ), and the “mark-up” parameter ( ): 
14 
 
 
  
                   
        [                  ]
                                                                                 (15) 
  
 √    
    
                                                                                                                 (16) 
 
How likely is it for these conditions to hold? To answer this question we note that if, 
as we have already assumed,      and b=1, then to generate a labour demand 
elasticity equal to 0.5, we must set      . Doing so, equation (15) implies that 
   √   =2.243. Since     measures the percentage difference between the 
MW (per unit of time) and the wage (per unit of time) that the lowest ability worker 
would earn in a perfectly competitive market,         implies that the markup on 
the competitive wage could be as high as 124 percent and the condition would still be 
satisfied.
16
 Assuming that       , the maximum value of   for which both 
conditions would be satisfied is 1.07; i.e. even if (some of) the unemployed workers 
received far more than what they would earn in the PC case
17
 - thus necessitating the 
imposition of a high tax rate to pay for their unemployment benefits, the after-tax 
income of employed workers would be larger than in the PC case.   
What if       , and     ? Although in this case it is impossible to derive 
analytically conditions equivalent to equations (15) and (16), after a wide 
experimentation with plausible parameter values regarding parameters  , b ,      and 
  (as long as the labour demand elasticity remains less than 1), we have not been able 
to find a single case in which the imposition of a MW would not be supported by the 
majority of workers.   
The reason why there will be a majority of workers in favour of imposing a 
minimum wage is that when the labour demand elasticity is less than 1, aggregate 
wage income can increase by imposing a binding minimum wage that leaves some 
workers (i.e. the lowest-ability ones) unemployed. It is thus possible, through the use 
of an appropriate unemployment benefits scheme to fully compensate the unemployed 
                                                          
16
 Regarding actual minimum wages, it is not obvious what this difference could be mainly because no 
actual labour market can be considered as perfectly competitive even in the absence of a national 
minimum wage. Still, it is rather improbable that      is not a safe assumption to make for most 
countries.  
17
 For example, if  =1, the (after-tax) income of the lowest ability worker, who will be unemployed in 
the MW case, will be 2.24 times the income that he would receive in the PC case (=w) if       . A 
worker with ability       ,  would receive an income exactly equal to the income she would receive 
in the PC case.    
15 
 
for their loss of wage income, and still leave the after-tax incomes of employed 
workers higher than in the PC case.
18
  
 
3. In-Kind Redistribution 
 
We now consider an economy which produces and consumes two goods (X and Y). 
Good X is a homogeneous good produced by private-sector firms only, whereas good 
Y is a (vertically) differentiated product which can be produced at different quality 
levels by private-sector firms and by the public sector.  
 
3.1 Perfectly Competitive Labour Market  
3.1.1 Production 
We again use the homogeneous good Χ as the numeraire (       and assume the 
same technology as in Section 2. Thus, equations (1) to (3) of Section 2 hold for the 
present model as well.  
The vertically differentiated product, Y, can be produced at various quality 
levels in both the private and the public sector. We wish to capture the fact that, for 
many government-provided goods (or services), some citizens choose not to 
“consume” them (even though they are eligible for doing so and there is no price-tag 
attached to them), preferring instead to purchase them from the private sector. Typical 
examples of such publicly provided goods are health care, child care, old-age care, 
housing, and education. One reason for this is that these goods may be provided by 
the government at a lower quality level than the quality level that (high-income) 
households would like to consume, and there is a large degree of lumpiness associated 
with their consumption. For example, it is nearly impossible for a student to attend at 
the same time a public and a private educational institution (or to attend both 
institutions part-time thus achieving a full-time status), or for a patient to have part of 
a heart operation at a public hospital and the rest of the operation at a private one. 
Moreover, in many cases it confers no extra utility (or it is detrimental) to supplement 
publicly provided goods with privately provided ones (i.e., first having an operation at 
                                                          
18
 Note also that some of the taxes necessary to support the unemployed would be raised through the 
taxation of profit income, thus making the political support for minimum wages even stronger (see, e.g. 
Adam and Moutos, 2011). However, as argued by Economides and Moutos (2016), this argument may 
not hold if we allow for capital accumulation and take into account the detrimental effects of higher 
taxation on capital accumulation – and thus on the position of the static labour demand curve.  
16 
 
a public hospital and afterwards supplementing it with another operation at a private 
hospital). High-income households will often elect to pay in order to avail themselves 
of the highest quality of these services – rather than be satisfied with the (sometimes) 
mediocre quality offered by the public sector.  
We assume that quality is measured by an index 0Q  , and that there is 
complete information regarding the quality index (see, e.g. Rosen, 1974; Helpman and 
Flam, 1987). We further assume that for private sector firms, average costs depend on 
quality and that, for any given quality level, the average cost is independent of the 
number of units produced. These assumptions are captured by the following 
production function: 
 
    
  
   
   ,      .                                                                                                 (17)   
 
In equation (17),       denotes the number of units of good Y  of quality     provided 
by the private sector, and    denotes the effective units of labour used. This particular 
specification implies that as quality increases more (effective) units of labour are 
required to produce each unit of the Y good.  It also implies that the (average) cost 
and, under perfect competition, also the price at which each unit of the good of quality 
Q  will be a function of quality – but independent of the level of output
19
: 
 
                  .                                                                                     (18) 
 
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that the public sector uses a 
similar technology to produce the good,  pays the same wage rate (per effective unit 
of labour), but for various reasons it may be a less efficient producer than private 
sector firms.
20
 We capture this (potential) difference in efficiency between the private 
and the public sector by assuming that     in the public sector. Accordingly 
average costs in the public sector are  
                                                          
19
 Thus, private producers of the vertically differentiated product earn zero profits.   
20
 The assumption that the public sector is less efficient than the private sector dates back to Baumol 
(1967) and is discussed in Katsimi (1998).  This relative inefficiency may be justified (even if the two 
sectors use the same technology) on the grounds of imperfect monitoring as a result of the absence of 
competition or the lack of transparency of property rights. We note that the qualitative nature of our 
results would not change if we assumed that  the public sector is as efficient as the private sector (i.e. 
      
17 
 
                                                                                                                   (19) 
 
where the subscript G denotes the public sector, and    is the quality offered to 
households at no charge by the public sector.    
In what follows we assume that there is a single quality offered by the private 
sector (
PQ ), and a single quality offered by the public sector (  ). Since no 
household would wish to pay to buy the privately provided quality if       , we 
assume that      . 
 
3.1.2 Households 
All households are assumed to have identical preferences, and their mass is set to 1. 
Following Rosen (1974), and Flam and Helpman (1987), we assume that the 
homogeneous good is divisible, whereas the quality-differentiated product is 
indivisible and households can consume only one unit of it.  For simplicity we write 
the utility function as
21
 
 
   √     
 
where    and    stand for the quantity of the homogeneous good  and the quality of 
good Y (either the privately or the publicly provided variety) consumed by household 
i . The distribution of ability (i.e. effective number of labour units) is assumed to be as 
in the previous Section.                                                                                               
Since good Y is also offered by the public sector, and households can consume 
either the privately provided variety or the variety provided by the government, 
households, in effect, face two mutually exclusive budget constraints. The budget 
constraint of a household deciding to acquire a variety of Y which is offered by the 
private sector is: 
 
                .                                                                                             
 
                                                          
21
 The Cobb-Douglas utility function has the advantage – in addition to being easy to work with – that 
it produces results which are independent of the level of the economy‟s average income.  
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where t stands for the income tax rate. Given the quality level of the privately 
provided variety, the household‟s demand for the homogeneous good is: 
 
                .                                                                                         (20) 
  
If the household chooses to consume the publicly (and freely) provided variety (    
the  entire disposable income of the household is spent on the homogeneous good, and 
the demand for it is: 
  
           .                                                                                                        (21)                               
 
The resulting indirect utility of the household is then, 
 
  
  √ [           ]  , if it chooses to consume a privately offered variety        
  
  √          , if it chooses to consume the publicly offered variety      
 
We note that the difference between P
iV and 
G
iV is increasing in ability (and income).  
Thus, only households with relative large incomes will be willing to pass by the 
possibility of consuming for free the publicly provided variety and instead pay to 
acquire the high quality variety offered by the private sector. Let   denote the ability 
of a household that is indifferent between consuming the publicly provided variety 
and the privately produced variety, i.e., for this household it holds that: 
 
√ [          ]   = √                                                         
                                                                         
We term   the dividing level of ability. Households with ability greater than   will 
prefer to pay in order to acquire the privately offered variety, whereas households 
with ability smaller than   will avail themselves of the freely offered public variety. 
Solving the above equation for   we find that:  
 
  
   
 
            
                                                                                                        (22) 
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From equation (22) we note that dθ/dβ>0, i.e. that – ceteris paribus – as the private 
sector becomes more productive in the provision of the vertically differentiated 
product (β becomes smaller), the higher will be the number of  households who would 
choose to pay in order to acquire the privately supplied variety. From the same 
equation we note also that – ceteris paribus – the higher is quality provided for free 
by the public sector (QG ), the higher will be θ , and the fewer will be the households 
willing to pay for the private variety.                                                                                                             
The Pareto distribution implies that the proportion (and number) of households 
with ability smaller or equal to   is 
 
       *
 
 
+
 
.                                                                                                       (23) 
 
Thus, the number of households which choose to consume the publicly provided 
variety will be equal to 1 ( / )ab  , and this will also be the number of units of 
quality      produced by the public  sector. The corresponding demand, and 
production, of units of quality    by the private sector will be equal to ( / )
ab  .  As a 
result, the demand for effective units of labour by the public sector will be equal to 
,  *
 
 
+
 
-  , whereas the corresponding demand by the private producers of the 
vertically differentiated good will be equal to  *
 
 
+
 
   . 
 
3.1.3 Labour Market Equilibrium 
Aggregate demand for effective units of labour is equal to the sum of labour demand 
by the producers of the homogeneous good and the demand by private and the public 
producers of the vertically differentiated product
22
, i.e. it is equal to  
 
   
 
 *
 
 
+
 
    ,  *
 
 
+
 
-   . 
 
                                                          
22
 For completeness, one must add the demand for labour arising from the consumption of the VDP by 
the fixed number of the owners of the firms which receive the profits from their operation. We assume 
that the (after-tax) profit income of these individuals is high enough so that they always consume the 
privately provided variety, thus adding a constant to the aggregate demand for labour – which, for 
simplicity, we ignore.   
20 
 
The aggregate supply of effective labour units is just the mean ability in the 
population, which is equal to (
  
   
). Thus, the equation describing labour market 
equilibrium is:  
 
   
 
 *
 
 
+
 
    ,  *
 
 
+
 
-    
  
   
 .                                                                 (24) 
 
Another way to write this equation will prove more informative for what follows, i.e. 
  
   
 
 
  
   
 *
 
 
+
 
    ,  *
 
 
+
 
-   .                                                                (24a) 
 
This equation states that labour market equilibrium obtains when the net supply of 
labour to the homogeneous sector –i.e. the total supply of labour minus the effective 
labour units required for the production of the private and public varieties of the VDP 
– is equal to the demand for labour by the producers of the homogeneous good.  
 
3.1.4 Government Budget Constraint  
The government‟s revenue consists of taxes on wage income and on profits. We 
assume that a common, and proportional, tax rate is applied to both wage income and 
profits. Given that aggregate wage income is equal to  (
  
   
), and aggregate profits 
from the production of the homogeneous good
23
 are equal to  
 
 
 
   
 
   , the 
government‟s budget constraint can be written as:  
 
 , (
  
   
)  
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+
 
-                                                                (25) 
 
The right-hand-side of equation (25) is government spending, which just equals the 
total cost of producing the required units of the vertically differentiated product (i.e. 
the units demanded by households with ability less or equal to  ).24  
                                                          
23
 See equation (3). Note also that private producers of the vertically differentiated good make no 
profits.  
24
 In principle, the government could, instead of providing for free the vertically differentiated good, 
charge a price lower than the cost of producing it. We discuss below the possible ramifications of this 
for our analysis.  
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We assume that the tax rate adjusts so as to keep the government‟s budget in 
balance. 
 
3.1.5 General Equilibrium  
Since all private budget constraints are satisfied, general equilibrium in this economy 
obtains when the labour market is in equilibrium, and the government budget in 
balance.  
Equations (22), (24), and (25) can be solved to determine the values of 
         , and then the rest of the endogenous variables can be determined. We 
note that although the system is block-recursive, it is non-linear, and no analytic 
solution can be derived. Moreover, due to the nonlinearity of the system, it is not 
possible to exclude theoretically the possibility of multiple equilibria. Nevertheless, 
we can report that after extensive numerical simulations with a wide range of 
plausible parameter values we have not found a single case of multiple equilibria. 
These numerical simulations are available upon request.   
 
3.2 Minimum Wages  
We now assume the existence of a government-imposed minimum wage per unit of 
labour time (e.g. per hour) equal to  , which is the minimum amount that an employer 
must pay in order to employ one person. This minimum wage per unit of time must be 
distinguished from the wage rate per effective unit of labour, which will be market-
determined (i.e. as in the previous section).  
Since, preferences, technology, and the distribution of ability remain as in the 
case with a perfectly competitive labour market, the dividing level of ability,  , is still 
determined by equation (22). 
 
3.2.1 Labour Market 
As in Section 2, the minimum wage constraint implies that firms will not be willing to 
employ workers whose level of ability (i.e. number of efficient units of labour per unit 
of time) is such that      , where   stands for the market-determined wage rate 
per effective unit of labour in the presence of the minimum-wage (per unit of time) 
constraint. If   denotes the level of ability for which it holds that         the total 
22 
 
number of effective units of labour supplied by individuals with      is equal to 
  
   
 ,
 
 
-
 
 (see equation (11)). 
The wage rate per effective unit of labour paid by private sector firms is 
determined by equating the demand for effective units of labour (which is equal to the 
sum of labour demand by the producers of the homogeneous good and the demand by 
private and the public producers of the vertically differentiated product) with the 
supply of effective labour units possessed by individuals with      :  
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+
 
-    = 
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-
 
                                                            (26) 
 
3.2.2 Government 
As before, we assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Its revenue arises 
from taxing the aggregate wage income in the private sector - which is equal to the 
wage rate (   times the effective labour units supplied to the private sector 
(
  
   
,
 
 
-
 
   plus the taxation of profits. Its expenditure is the net (i.e. after tax) 
payments of the minimum wage to each of the public sector employees. We assume 
that the government pays the same wage rate per effective unit of labour as private 
sector firms, and that it is meritocratic in the sense that it hires only those with ability 
    .
25
  Note that the number of unemployed workers is equal to   ,
 
 
-
 
  Thus, the 
government budget constraint is:                                       
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)                               (27) 
 
3.2.3 General Equilibrium 
Equations (9), (22), (26) and (27) can be solved to determine the values of  
            , and then the rest of the endogenous variables can be determined. We 
again note that although the system is block-recursive, it is non-linear, and no analytic 
solution can be derived. Nevertheless, we can draw some useful results by comparing 
the perfectly competitive (PC) with the minimum wage (MW) case. 
                                                          
25
 Assuming that the government may hire less able workers and thus increase the cost of providing    
may be an interesting extension of our analysis.  
23 
 
 
3.3 Comparison 
We now proceed to compare the equilibrium outcomes in the MW and PC cases. 
Since it is impossible to derive closed-form solutions, we resort to numerical 
calculations. 
 
3.3.1 Parameter values 
Table 1 reports the baseline parameter values for policy, technology and preferences 
used to obtain the values of the endogenous variables.  
In accordance with the relevant empirical studies we set the baseline value of 
parameter    which determines the shape of the Pareto distribution and is a measure of 
income inequality among workers, equal to 2, and its “extreme” values to 1.5 and 2.5. 
We note that for    , the Gini coefficient, whose value for the Pareto distribution is 
  
 
    
 , is equal to 0.33, which is very close to the average estimates for the values 
of labour income inequality among full-time workers observed in OECD economies 
(see, for example, Koske. Fournier and Wanner, 2012).
26
 Parameter  , which stands 
for the lowest ability among households, can be chosen arbitrarily so that the model‟s 
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables match well with actual economies; we 
set it to 1.
27
  
Among the rest of the parameter values, of particular importance is the 
difference between the values of    and   . Since both of these values are indices of 
how consumers perceive the quality inherent in the privately and publicly provided 
varieties of the VDP, one way to get a handle on a meaningful difference between 
them is to choose them in such a way so as to have the percentage of the population 
opting out of the consumption of the freely provided public variety being close to 
what we observe in many countries. For example, the percentage of the population 
among OECD countries choosing to pay in order to avail themselves of the privately 
provided variety is often below 10 percent.
28
 With this in mind, we initially set 
                                                          
26
 The “extreme” values for   (i.e. 1.5 and 2.5) correspond also to the lowest and highest estimates 
among OECD countries for the Gini coefficient of labour income inequality among full-time workers 
in this study.  
27
 This is just a normalization; different values of b would not affect the qualitative nature of the results. 
28
 The percentage of students in privately managed elementary and secondary schools is in many 
OECD countries below 10 percent (e.g. 10 percent in Sweden,9 percent in the United States, 6 percent 
in the United Kingdom, 5 percent in Germany – see, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/50110750.pdf). Note 
that this figure includes schools managed by religious organizations which are sometimes funded by 
24 
 
    , and       , so that at the initial constellation of parameter values the 
percentage of workers consuming the privately provided variety of the VDP is 6.4 
percent.
29
 As argued in the previous section, we initially set parameters    and   so 
that     , and normalize them to    , and      parameter   is set at 0.5 – 
implying a moderately generous social welfare support for the unemployed. Finally, 
we initially consider a minimum wage (per unit of time) that is a moderate 10 percent 
above what the minimum ability worker would earn in the PC case (i.e.         
       ). 
    
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Baseline Case 
The consequences resulting from adopting a “moderately” binding minimum wage 
which is (per unit of time) 10 percent higher than what the worker with the lowest 
ability would earn in the PC case, are shown in the first line of Table 2. With     
   , the introduction of the MW results in a rise in the pre-tax wage rate (per effective 
unit of labour) from 1.64 to 1.7207 (a rise by about 5 percent), which in turn prices 
the least able workers out of employment, generating an unemployment rate equal to 
9.02 percent. (We note that the unemployment rate is the percentage of 
persons/workers that are unemployed, and this must be distinguished from the 
percentage of effective labour units which are priced out of employment; given that 
the persons with the lowest endowment of effective labour units are unemployed, the 
percentage of effective labour units which are priced out of employment would be 
about 4.6 percent.) Given that the generosity of the unemployment benefits parameter 
  is set at 0.5, all unemployed workers will have an after-tax income and utility which 
will be lower than in the PC case. Among the workers at the top of the ability 
distribution only 6.36 percent (=1-0.9364) would choose to buy the privately supplied 
variety of the VDP (whose quality index is:     ) in the PC case; this proportion 
drops to 5.83 percent in the MW case. This is a consequence of two forces: first, the 
emergence of unemployment requires a rise in the tax rate from 18.26 percent in the 
PC case to 21.74 percent in the MW case, thus reversing much of the rise in the pre-
                                                                                                                                                                      
the government and do not charge substantial or any fees. Regarding health care no easily comparable 
data are available, as some patients may use public hospitals for some operations and go private in 
other cases.  
29
 Note that if we assume that firm owners are included in our calculations, the share of the population 
consuming the privately provided variety would possibly be about 10 percent.  
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tax wage rate (per effective unit of labour) from 1.64 to 1.7207, which is generated by 
the imposition of the minimum wage; the after-tax wage rate rises by from 1.3405 to 
1.3466 (a rise by about 0.5 percent), and second, the rise in the cost of producing (and 
the price of)    due to the rise in the wage rate.
 30
 
Among the workers that remain employed (the 90.98 percent), some workers 
will be better off under the MW regime, while some others will be worse off. To 
understand how workers of different ability will fare after the introduction of the MW, 
we start by dividing the employed workers in three distinct groups.  
The first group contains those workers (of moderate-to-high ability) that 
remain employed after the introduction of the MW, and continue to consume the 
freely provided     These workers, provided that the after-tax wage rate rises,
31
 will 
clearly be better off with the MW since their consumption of the homogeneous good 
rises and continue to consume the freely provided     This group represents 84.62 
percent of all workers, and its size is equal to the difference between the percentage of 
workers that were consuming    in the PC case (93.64) and the percentage that 
become unemployed in the MW case (9.02). We note that this group always
32
contains 
the worker with median ability, and that all members of this group will always be 
unanimous in their preferences regarding the introduction of the MW. Given that the 
preferences of this group (due to its size) are pivotal for the political viability of the 
MW, in what follows we shall call this group the median-ability group. Thus, 
examining the utility of the worker with median ability in the PC and MW cases will 
be sufficient to determine the preferences of the median-ability group, and to infer 
whether there is a majority among workers in favour of the MW regime.    
The second group contains the workers of very high ability that purchase the 
private variety of the VDP before and after the introduction of the MW (i.e. these are 
the workers whose ability is at least 4.1401 in Table 2). For these workers, their utility 
will be:  
 
    √ [             ]   ,       in the PC regime, and,  
                                                          
30
 Note that the cost of producing the public variety will also rise after the introduction of the MW due 
to the rise in the wage rate, thus the tax rate will increase for this reason as well.   
31
 Although we cannot establish this analytically, we have not been able to find a single case under 
plausible parameter values for which this is not true.  
32
 This is because we assume that the percentage of workers purchasing the privately produced variety 
of the VDP (  ) is a small percentage of all workers. 
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    √ [            ]  ,    in the MW regime.  
Whether     is larger or smaller than     it depends only on the income that is left 
after purchasing     Thus, it depends on the sign of the expression Γ, defined as 
   [            ]    [             ]  This expression can be re-
written as [                 ]          , which can be either 
positive or negative. Assuming that the after-tax wage rate in the MW case is higher 
than in the PC case, the value of    is increasing in    Thus, it is possible that among 
workers of very high ability (i.e. those choosing to consume    under both cases), 
only those of exceptionally high ability will prefer the imposition of a MW. This is 
understandable since the imposition of the MW raises the cost of acquiring    by the 
same amount for all workers (i.e. by         ), but the total increase in nominal 
wage income due to the higher wage rate will be higher for higher ability workers. 
Thus, among the 5.83 percent of workers which choose to buy the privately supplied 
variety of the VDP in the MW case, 5.82 percent (among all workers) will be against 
introducing the MW, and only the remaining 0.01 percent will be in favour of the 
MW. We note that it is possible for a worker to be against the introduction of the MW 
even when her after-tax nominal wage income rises.   
The third group of workers contains those with high ability that switch from 
consuming    to consuming    after the introduction of the MW. (In the baseline 
case with       , these are the workers with ability (e) between  3.9638 and 
4.1401.) The reason that the dividing level of ability   (i.e. the ability level above 
which workers/households will prefer to pay in order to acquire   , whereas 
households with ability smaller than   will avail themselves of the freely offered   ) 
rises after the MW is imposed, is that the rise in the (price, and) cost of producing     
rises in proportion to the rise in the (gross) wage rate, whereas the after-tax nominal 
wage income rises by a smaller proportion due to the rise in the tax rate. Thus, the 
worker who was previously indifferent between purchasing    and using   , will 
now be induced to switch to consuming the freely available   , since, as argued in the 
previous paragraph, if the level of ability is not very high, the rise in after-tax income 
will be smaller than the rise in the cost of     As a result, this group of workers will 
also be against the introduction of the MW; its size is  equal to 0.53 percent of all 
workers (i.e. the difference between the percentage that were using    before (93.64) 
and after the introduction of the MW (94.17)).  
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In aggregate, the workers which are against the MW are equal to the sum of 
unemployed (9.02 percent), the 5.82 percent among the second group, and the third 
group (0.53 percent), i.e. it is equal to 15.37 percent. Those being in favour of 
introducing the MW are the sum of the median-ability group (84.62 percent) and the 
0.01 percent among the second group (those of exceptionally high ability), i.e. it is 
equal to 84.63 percent. If citizens express their policy preferences on the basis of their 
personal welfare alone, the MW would garner a winning coalition comprising the 
moderate- to high-ability workers, and the exceptionally high-ability workers. This 
non-monotonic relationship between worker ability and policy preferences  regarding 
MW can partly match with what Stigler (1970) termed Director‟s Law – according to 
which public interventions are made for the primary benefit of the middle classes, and 
financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the rich and the poor.
33
    
Block A of Table 2 examines whether the political viability of the MW 
depends on how large it is relative to the PC benchmark. The baseline result assumed 
the imposition of a MW (per unit of time) that is a moderate 10 percent above what 
the minimum ability worker would earn in the PC case (i.e.              
    ). As the (gross) markup ( ) of the minimum wage (per unit of time) over what 
the minimum ability worker would earn in the PC case increases, the popularity of the 
MW decreases, and eventually receives no political support when  =1.20. This is a 
consequence of the progressively higher unemployment rate that a higher   generates, 
implying larger increases in the tax rate and a drop in the after-tax wage rate. The rise 
in the tax rate is due to three factors. First, to the rise in unemployment and the need 
to finance the provision of unemployment benefits, second, to the assumed 
proportionality between the level of the minimum wage and the unemployment 
benefit, and, third, to the rise in the cost of producing    since the wage rate 
increases.
34
  
We note the contrast in this finding (i.e. that even small markups of the MW 
over what the minimum ability worker would earn in the PC case ( =1.20) would 
                                                          
33
 The matching is imperfect since in our model the exceptionally able workers (the top 0.01 percent) 
would be better-off with the MW.  
34
 We note that although the political popularity (i.e. the share workers that prefer the MW regime over 
the PC one) of the MW drops as    increases from 1 to 1.2, the utility of the median-ability worker 
initially rises as   increases from 1 to 1.1, and then declines. The two effects are compatible with each 
other, since the drop in political popularity is (mainly) driven by the reduction in the size of the 
median-ability group due to the transfer of the lowest ability members of this group to the rank of 
unemployed as   increases.  
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receive no political support for the MW), to the finding in Section 2 that the MW 
would receive widespread political support even for far larger markups in the absence 
of in-kind redistribution.  
Block B portrays how the generosity of the unemployment benefit system – as 
captured by parameter   - affects the desirability of the MW (baseline:       .  
The political support for the MW increases when the unemployed receive less 
support, since this allows for a smaller increase in the tax rate relative to the PC case. 
However, the MW would receive no political support if the unemployment benefit 
system became mildly generous (      ). Again, this result should be contrasted 
with the case of no in-kind redistribution, in which case even when   is larger than 1 
the MW would be preferred by either all or a large majority of workers.  
Finally, the influence of (in)equality in the distribution of ability – as captured 
by parameter   – is portrayed in Block C (baseline:        ). Since changing   
affects the mean ability in the economy (         ⁄   if  b remains unchanged, 
in order to isolate the effects of changes in the distribution of ability we allow b to 
adjust whenever   changes so as to keep mean ability constant. We observe that the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of ability has no appreciable influence on the 
desirability of the MW.      
  
3.3.2.2 The influence of in-kind redistribution 
Table 3 reveals how the extent of in-kind redistribution – as measured by the quality 
of the publicly provided variety – affects the political viability of the MW institution. 
For ease of comparison we include the baseline case with       . We first note that 
as    rises from 0.1 to 0.5, there is large majority of workers (about 84 percent) in 
favour of introducing the MW. However, when    rises to 0.6 (and above)
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 there 
will be no worker that will be better-off with the MW. Naturally, as    rises, the 
proportion of workers choosing to avail themselves of the (free) publicly provided 
variety rises from  about 88 percent when        (in both the PC and MW cases) to 
about 98 percent when      (in both cases).  As expected, the tax rate needed to 
finance this rise in the quality of the publicly provided variety rises sharply from less 
than 5 percent (in both cases) to over 40 percent (in both cases), with the tax rate 
being higher in the MW case.  
                                                          
35
 In fact, the crucial value of   above which the MW receives no support from any worker is 0.55. 
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In addition to its effect on the tax rate, a higher    implies an increased 
demand for effective units of labour by the government, reducing the effective units 
of labour available for hiring by private sector firms (both homogeneous good- and 
VDP-producers), thus resulting in a positive relationship between    and the wage 
rate (this holds in both the PC and the MW case).  However, the rise in the wage rate 
is more than fully offset by the rise in the tax rate, thus resulting in a negative 
relationship between    and the after-tax wage rate (in both cases). This is a desirable 
feature of our model since otherwise the government could make most of the workers 
better-off by engaging in ever higher, and higher, doses of redistribution through 
further rises in      (In such a case, employed workers belonging to the median-ability 
group would be better-off since they would be able to consume higher quantities of 
the homogeneous good and to avail themselves of the higher quality of the publicly 
provided VDP.) However, it is still possible for utility to increase as    increases up 
to some point, since the decline in the after-tax wage income can be offset (in utility 
terms) by the rise in       Indeed, Table 3 reveals that utility of the median-ability
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worker (i.e. a worker who is always employed and consumes the government-
provided variety of the VDP) keeps rising until     rises above 1 (maximum utility is 
reached when     1.15 in the PC case, and when          in the MW case).   
Figure 1 (based on Table 3) reveals that once the level of     is not far too 
small relative to the level which maximizes the utility of the median-ability agent 
under PC, the median-ability worker (as well as all workers belonging to the median-
ability group which comprises far more than 50 percent of all workers) would 
experience a reduction in her utility from the introduction of the MW. This implies 
that when an adequate amount of politically viable redistribution is undertaken via the 
public provision of private goods, adding a less efficient redistributive device (like the 
MW) to the policy arsenal can be welfare reducing. In contrast, when, the initial 
equilibrium involves too little redistribution, the introduction of the MW can be a 
useful “complement” for the lack of adequate redistribution (from the point of view of 
the majority of employed workers).   
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 The median-ability worker should not be interpreted as the median-voter in our model.   
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4. Conclusion  
 
      The paper has argued that the absence of efficient redistribution mechanisms, like 
in-kind transfers, from the policy landscape increases the political support for the MW 
institution, whereas their strong presence renders the MW institution politically non-
viable. This fining matches well with the actual policy/institutional environment 
across Europe regarding the existence of the minimum wage institution. We have also 
shown that the smaller is the presence of efficient redistribution mechanisms, the 
higher is the level of the minimum wage that can be preferred by the majority of 
workers. This prediction can also explain well why countries with non-existent (or 
meager) in-kind redistributive schemes would tend to have higher minimum wages 
(e.g. Greece before the crisis) than –ceteris paribus - countries with extensive in-kind 
redistribution.  Finally, our model predicts that the less generous is the unemployment 
benefits system, the more likely it is for the minimum wage institution to emerge – a 
prediction which also matches well with the experience of European countries, but 
also in comparison with the other side of the Atlantic.  
 
      Possible caveats and extensions of our analysis include allowing for progressive 
taxation, tax evasion, and the existence of self-employment. We can report that we 
have verified that the introduction of progressive taxation within our framework does 
not alter the qualitative nature of our results. The introduction of a second sector (e.g. 
services) which is dominated by self-employed individuals who have larger 
opportunities for tax evasion may prove to be a fruitful extension of our framework.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Baseline parameterization  
 
Parameters Description Value 
 
  
 
Measure of relative efficiency in the private sector 
 
0.9 
 
  
 
Lowest ability among households 
 
1 
 
  
 
Shape parameter of the Pareto distribution 
 
2 
 
  
 
Technology parameter in the production function of the 
homogeneous good 
 
3 
 
  
 
Technology parameter in the production function of the 
homogeneous good 
 
1 
 
  
 
Measures the gross markup (i.e. the percentage by which the 
income of the lowest-ability worker would increase if he remained 
in employment after the introduction of the minimum wage) 
 
1.1 
 
  
 
 
Measure of the generosity of the social welfare support for the 
unemployed 
 
0.5 
 
   
 
Quality of the VDP good provided by the private sector  
 
3 
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Table 2: Comparison of PC and MW 
 
  
 
Comparative static results 
with respect to 
 
   
 
   
 
 
Labour Market 
 
% of workers that 
use the public good 
% of 
workers 
which 
are 
better off 
under 
MW 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
  
 
     ̅  
 
   
 
    (%) 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
 
 
Α 
 
 
 
 
   
 
1.05 
 
3.9638 
 
4.0488 
 
0.1826 
 
0.1998 
 
1.64 
 
1.6814 
 
1.0242 
 
4.66 
 
93.64 
 
93.90 
 
89.18 
 
1.10 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1401 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2174 
 
1.64 
 
1.7207 
 
1.0484 
 
9.02 
 
93.64 
 
94.17 
 
84.71 
 
1.15 
 
3.9638 
 
4.2383 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2355 
 
1.64 
 
1.7581 
 
1.0727 
 
13.10 
 
93.64 
 
94.43 
 
80.54 
 
1.20 
 
3.9638 
 
4.3440 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2541 
 
1.64 
 
1.7937 
 
1.0972 
 
16.93 
 
93.64 
 
94.70 
 
0 
 
 
Β 
 
 
   
 
0.4 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1178 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2132 
 
1.64 
 
1.7214 
 
1.0480 
 
8.95 
 
93.64 
 
94.10 
 
85.01 
 
0.5 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1401 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2174 
 
1.64 
 
1.7207 
 
1.0484 
 
9.02 
 
93.64 
 
94.17 
 
84.71 
 
0.6 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1630 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2217 
 
1.64 
 
1.72 
 
1.0488 
 
9.09 
 
93.64 
 
94.23 
 
0 
 
 
C 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
1.5 
 
0.67 
 
3.9635 
 
4.0773 
 
0.1825 
 
0.2054 
 
1.6518 
 
1.7070 
 
0.7096 
 
8.94 
 
93.10 
 
93.39 
 
84.62 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1401 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2174 
 
1.64 
 
1.7207 
 
1.0484 
 
9.02 
 
93.64 
 
94.17 
 
84.71 
 
2.5 
 
1.2 
 
3.9642 
 
4.1761 
 
0.1827 
 
0.2242 
 
1.6109 
 
1.7068 
 
1.2459 
 
8.95 
 
94.96 
 
95.57 
 
86.04 
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Table 3: The influence of in-kind redistribution  
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Labour market 
 
% of workers 
that use the 
public good 
 
Utility of the 
median-ability 
agent 
% of 
workers 
which 
are 
better off 
under 
MW 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
PC 
 
MW       
  
 ̅  
 
   
 
  (%) 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
PC 
 
MW 
 
0.1 
 
2.8808 
 
2.9383 
 
0.0304 
 
0.0494 
 
1.4133 
 
1.4875 
 
1.0451 
 
8.45 
 
87.95 
 
88.42 
 
0.4402 
 
0.4472 
 
84.28 
 
0.2 
 
3.0898 
 
3.1661 
 
0.0637 
 
0.0863 
 
1.4619 
 
1.5374 
 
1.0460 
 
8.60 
 
89.53 
 
90.02 
 
0.6222 
 
0.6303 
 
84.07 
 
0.3 
 
3.3338 
 
3.4345 
 
0.1001 
 
0.1265 
 
1.5159 
 
1.5929 
 
1.0468 
 
8.75 
 
91 
 
91.52 
 
0.7608 
 
0.7683 
 
84 
 
0.4 
 
3.6215 
 
3.7545 
 
0.1397 
 
0.1702 
 
1.5754 
 
1.6541 
 
1.0476 
 
8.89 
 
92.38 
 
92.91 
 
0.8756 
 
0.8812 
 
84.17 
 
0.5 
 
3.9638 
 
4.1401 
 
0.1826 
 
0.2174 
 
1.64 
 
1.7207 
 
1.0484 
 
9.02 
 
93.64 
 
94.17 
 
0.9736 
 
0.9758 
 
84.71 
 
0.6 
 
4.3755 
 
4.6104 
 
0.2287 
 
0.2680 
 
1.7097 
 
1.7925 
 
1.0492 
 
9.15 
 
94.78 
 
95.30 
 
1.0578 
 
1.0552 
 
0 
 
1 
 
7.2296 
 
8.0598 
 
0.4398 
 
0.4975 
 
2.0325 
 
2.1251 
 
1.0521 
 
9.65 
 
98.09 
 
98.46 
 
1.2689 
 
1.2289 
 
0 
 
1.5 
 
20.0084 
 
27.9928 
 
0.7301 
 
0.8071 
 
2.5030 
 
2.6075 
 
1.0559 
 
10.31 
 
99.75 
 
99.87 
 
1.1971 
 
1.0330 
 
10.31 
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Figure 1: Utility of the median-ability agent as a function of    
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